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The Dynamics of Food 
Stamp Receipt after Welfare 







In the decade following passage of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, or welfare 
reform), numerous studies examined the correlates of leaving, returning 
to, and remaining on cash assistance. However, fewer have analyzed 
food stamp dynamics after welfare reform. Income limits for the Food 
Stamp Program are set higher than for the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program, under the assumption that low-income
working families not eligible for cash assistance should continue to re-
ceive food assistance. Declines in the food stamp caseload after welfare 
reform, although smaller than TANF declines, were greater than some 
observers thought were warranted. These observers point out that many 
eligible families were not receiving benefi ts to which they were en-
titled (FRAC 2000). Since the recession of 2001, food stamp caseloads 
have increased substantially, whereas TANF caseloads have hardly 
changed.
In this paper, we analyze data from the Women’s Employment 
Study (WES), a panel study conducted in one county in Michigan from 
1997 to 2003. WES includes monthly data on benefi t receipt that al-
low us to examine several questions related to food stamp dynamics 
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among current and former welfare recipients. The questions include the 
following:
• What characteristics are associated with a higher probability of 
exiting from food stamp receipt versus remaining on the rolls 
after the 1996 welfare reform? 
• What characteristics are associated with a higher probability of 
returning to food stamps after a postwelfare reform exit from the 
rolls? 
• What impact, if any, did two state policy changes—the switch 
to an Electronic Benefi t Transfer (EBT) system and changes in 
eligibility rules concerning assets—have on food stamp receipt? 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefl y summarize pre-
vious relevant studies. Next, we describe welfare policy changes in 
Michigan, particularly as they relate to the Food Stamp Program. We 
then describe our panel data, our analytic strategy, and the measures we 
use. Then, we present empirical results and conclude with a discussion 
of policy implications.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON FOOD STAMP DYNAMICS
While a large literature has examined the correlates of entry and 
exit from the cash welfare roles, both before and after welfare reform 
(e.g., Blank and Ruggles 1996; Grogger and Michalopoulos 2003), 
fewer studies have focused on food stamp dynamics. While we do not 
review all studies here, we highlight several that examine the role that 
individual factors, public policies, and the macroeconomy play in food 
stamp dynamics.
Zedlewski and Gruber (2001) and Zedlewski (2004) analyze data 
from the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) and fi nd that 
poor households that recently received cash welfare are more likely to 
use food stamps than are poor households that have no prior welfare 
receipt. However, the two studies fi nd few differences in the personal 
characteristics of food stamp users versus nonusers: those with less ed-
ucation and African Americans were more likely to remain on the rolls, 
but other characteristics, such as poor physical or mental health, were 
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not signifi cantly different between food stamp participants and nonpar-
ticipants (Zedlewski 2004).
McKernan and Ratcliffe (2003) use data from the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation (SIPP) to examine the correlates of 
food stamp participation among low-income working households. They 
fi nd that those working traditional daytime hours, holding multiple jobs, 
and working more hours are less likely to participate. However, this re-
lationship between employment and participation was stronger in the 
early 1990s than in the late 1990s, suggesting that program efforts to 
decrease barriers to participation may have become more successful.
The study most closely related to ours is that of Hefl in (2004), who 
examines food stamp exits and returns using the Women’s Employment 
Study. She fi nds that women who move into work are more likely to 
leave both cash assistance and the Food Stamp Program. Those who 
are married, have other adults in the household, and meet the diagnostic 
screening criteria for drug dependence are more likely to exit, while 
those who are older, have less education, a shorter welfare history, more 
children, lack access to a car, and have less knowledge of eligibility 
rules are less likely to exit. Hefl in uses the fi rst four waves of WES 
data, whereas we use all fi ve waves. Hefl in limits her sample to women 
whose incomes were below 130 percent of the poverty line, roughly the 
eligibility limit for the Food Stamp Program. However, her method for 
calculating household income is not exactly the same as the one that 
the welfare agency uses to determine program eligibility. Also, WES 
collected detailed household income for the month of the survey, not 
for every month. 
Our analyses build upon and extend Hefl in’s work by using all fi ve 
survey waves and including all respondents. Most importantly, Hefl in 
estimates the hazard of exiting from food stamps, whereas we distin-
guish between recipients who exit from food stamps while working and 
those who exit without a job, and, as discussed below, fi nd that many 
individual characteristics have differential effects on these exit types.
Other studies examine how program policies and the economy af-
fect food stamp usage. Danielson and Klerman (2006) fi nd that welfare 
reform and an improving economy explain food stamp caseload de-
clines during the late 1990s, while policies aimed at increasing program 
access and the weakening economy explain about half of the caseload 
increase in the early 2000s.
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Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Finegold (2007) combine data from SIPP 
and state-level policy data to test the effects of various welfare, food 
stamp, minimum wage, and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) policies 
on food stamp receipt. They fi nd that in states with more lenient vehicle 
exemption policies, longer periods between eligibility recertifi cation, 
and expanded categorical eligibility (e.g., deeming families receiving 
services funded through TANF automatically eligible for food stamps), 
food stamp receipt increases. On the other hand, biometric technology 
(such as fi ngerprint imaging) reduces food stamp receipt. Simplifi ed 
reporting and implementation of the EBT program, which moved food 
stamps from coupons to an electronic swipe card, increase food stamp 
receipt.
Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu (2008) use state administrative data from 
South Carolina and fi nd that exits from the Food Stamp Program are 
fi ve to six times higher in months in which families have to recertify 
their eligibility than in other months. Once South Carolina increased the 
length of time between eligibility recertifi cation, median spell lengths 
of food stamp receipt increased by nearly three months for households 
with earnings.
Our analyses build on these previous studies. Before describing our 
model, we review the policy context in Michigan.
THE POLICY CONTEXT IN MICHIGAN, 1997–2003
The Food Stamp and TANF programs have different eligibility lim-
its, treatment of earnings, defi nition of the family unit, and so on, but 
the rules in one may affect use of the other. Michigan began adopting 
a work-fi rst approach to welfare in 1994, requiring some recipients to 
participate in activities designed to move them into employment quick-
ly (Seefeldt, Danziger, and Danziger 2003). Once PRWORA passed, all 
but a small number of recipients (for example, those with disabilities 
or those caring for children or other family members with disabilities) 
were required to participate in job search activities immediately after 
applying for cash assistance. Failure to comply with these or other re-
quirements could result in loss of benefi ts, either immediately (for new 
applicants) or gradually (for those who were already recipients). 
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Michigan is one of 16 states that link receipt of food stamp benefi ts 
to compliance with TANF or other means-tested program rules (USDA 
2004). A mother not complying with TANF rules could face reduction 
or loss of TANF cash benefi ts for her entire family along with elimina-
tion of her individual food stamp allotment. In other states, food stamp 
benefi ts may not increase when TANF benefi ts are reduced by sanction-
ing, but the noncompliant adult may not lose her food stamp benefi ts 
(Zedlewski, Holcomb, and Duke 1998). 
As of April 1997, Michigan recipients on TANF for fewer than 60 
days and not complying with work requirements could be terminated 
immediately from TANF and be hit with a reduction in food stamp ben-
efi ts. Those receiving TANF for at least 60 days prior to noncompliance 
faced a 25 percent reduction in both TANF and food stamp benefi ts, 
and their TANF case would be closed if noncompliance continued for 
four months.1 
Recipients who followed the new rules could combine work, cash 
welfare, and food stamps, or just work and food stamps, depending on 
their monthly earnings. Like most states, Michigan changed its earned 
income disregard to encourage work; it allowed TANF recipients to 
keep the fi rst $200 of monthly earnings and 20 percent of the remain-
der. In 1997, a single mother with two children earning $6 an hour for 
20 hours of work a week could receive about $200 a month in TANF 
and about $310 in food stamps. If she worked 35 hours a week, she 
would lose all TANF benefi ts but would still receive about $300 in food 
stamps.2 
The PRWORA implemented a lifetime limit on receipt of cash as-
sistance: adults could receive TANF for no more than 60 months cu-
mulatively in their lifetime, or fewer months if the states where they 
lived chose a shorter time limit. All states must abide by the prohibition 
against using federal TANF funds for families exceeding this 60-month 
limit. However, Michigan is one of two states that did not put time lim-
its on cash assistance.3 Instead, the state uses its own funds to provide 
cash assistance to recipients who reach the federal limit and are in com-
pliance with program rules.
Several analysts (Blank and Schmidt 2001; Pavetti and Bloom 
2001; Zedlewski, Holcomb, and Duke 1998) developed post-PRWORA 
classifi cations of the stringency of state policy regimes. Most labeled 
Michigan’s policies as “moderate” or “mixed.” Policies such as the 
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requirement to engage immediately in work activities (the federal re-
quirement at the time was, within 24 months, to start looking for work 
or to participate in activities geared toward fi nding a job) and the pos-
sibility of full-family sanctions were strict. Others, such as the lack of 
a time limit, were lenient. The state’s cash benefi t in the late 1990s was 
higher than average—$459 a month for a family of three with no other 
income, compared to $379 for the median state. However, the earned 
income disregard policy was not especially generous, and only part-
time and low-wage workers could combine welfare and work. As noted 
above, a single mother with two children who worked 35 hours a week 
at a job paying $6 an hour was not eligible for cash assistance; in 24 
other states, she would be eligible. 
Even though Michigan’s policies were moderate relative to those of 
other states, its TANF caseload declined at a rate similar to the national 
average. Between 1996 and 2003, cash assistance cases declined by 
about 56 percent nationwide and by about 58 percent in Michigan (au-
thors’ tabulations). Food stamp caseloads declined less. Over the same 
years, the average number of food stamp recipients declined by only 10 
percent in Michigan and by only 17 percent nationwide. Food stamp 
caseloads in Michigan fell by 36 percent between 1996 and 2000 but 
then rose because of the 2001 recession. The average monthly caseload 
in Michigan climbed from 603,000 to 838,000 between 2000 and 2003 
(HHS 2005). In Michigan, the food stamp participation rate among eli-
gible families is estimated to be 65 percent, well above the 56 percent 
national average (Castner and Schirm 2005). It is unclear the extent to 
which this higher participation rate is related to particular state prac-
tices, to the state’s distressed economy, or to some combination of the 
two. 
As noted, Michigan families who are sanctioned for noncompliance 
with TANF rules can also lose their food stamps. Sanctioned families 
are more likely to be disadvantaged than nonsanctioned recipients on 
measures such as low education or poor health (Cherlin et al. 2002; 
Kalil, Seefeldt, and Wang 2002). If these disadvantages also make it 
less likely that sanctioned adults fi nd jobs, then they might be more 
likely to reapply for TANF, food stamps, or both. On the other hand, if 
these disadvantages make it diffi cult for sanctioned adults to understand 
program rules about why they were sanctioned or how they might be-
come eligible again, then they might be less likely to reapply.
up08djivafch5.indd   108 10/8/2008   10:30:26 AM
Food Stamp Receipt after Welfare Reform   109
Michigan’s choice about how frequently to require food stamp re-
cipients to recertify their eligibility affects participation, as shorter re-
certifi cation periods are associated with lower program use (Kabbani 
and Wilde 2003). Federal policy requires that all cases with working 
adults be redetermined for eligibility at least once every 12 months. Be-
fore passage of the 2002 Farm Bill, states could choose periods as short 
as six months for working recipients in an effort to lower program error 
rates. In Michigan, TANF recipients are subject to the federal 12-month 
recertifi cation period; those not on TANF must be recertifi ed every six 
months if they have earnings (USDA 2003). Frequent recertifi cations 
might reduce participation, particularly among working TANF leavers, 
as more frequent updating of eligibility raises participation costs. 
Michigan simplifi ed reporting requirements for TANF and food 
stamp recipients, which may ease administrative burdens. Typically, 
families must report any changes in employment, earnings, or income, 
along with other changes that could affect eligibility. For adults whose 
earnings or employment status changes frequently, this reporting re-
quirement might be burdensome. With simplifi ed reporting for the 
Food Stamp Program, families must report changes in earned income 
only when they exceed 130 percent of usual monthly earnings (USDA 
2003).
Other policy changes might have affected participation over our 
study period. First, between 1996 and 2000, Michigan faced federal 
penalties for having food stamp overpayment of benefi ts by rates of 11 
to 16 percent, which was above the national 9 percent rate (Seefeldt, 
Danziger, and Danziger 2003). In an effort to achieve compliance, 
the state devoted extra resources during 2000 and 2001 to monitoring 
the Food Stamp Program. Increased monitoring might have deterred 
some working families from applying and caused others to be deemed 
ineligible. 
Second, in 2001, because of federal program changes, Michigan ad-
opted an Electronic Benefi t Transfer program (EBT) to distribute both 
TANF and food stamp benefi ts. Instead of receiving food coupons, re-
cipients are issued a “Bridge Card,” which functions like a debit card. 
Proponents argue that this reduces the stigma associated with food 
stamps, as shoppers using the Bridge Card appear no different than debit-
card users at checkout counters. If stigma kept some recipients from us-
ing food stamps, then EBT might encourage a return to the rolls.
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Michigan also changed how it treated assets in eligibility determi-
nation over the study period. Prior to 1997, Michigan received a federal 
waiver to exempt one vehicle from a client’s assets. Because it was 
thought that car ownership would facilitate the transition from welfare 
to work, the state allowed recipients who owned cars to maintain eligi-
bility for food stamps. In September of 1999, the waiver expired, and 
for about one year vehicles were included in the asset test for eligibil-
ity determination. Through a creative categorical eligibility policy, the 
state eventually exempted all vehicles from consideration. 
Finally, changes in Michigan’s economic climate are likely to have 
affected participation over time. In the fi rst few years following the 
1996 reform, Michigan’s economy was booming, and its unemploy-
ment rate was below the national average. However, the recession of 
2001 and the continuing loss of manufacturing jobs led the unemploy-
ment rate to increase and remain above the national average. In 2003, 
the national unemployment rate was 6 percent, but in Michigan the rate 
was more than 7 percent.
DATA SOURCES 
We analyze panel data from the Women’s Employment Study 
(WES), conducted by the Program on Poverty and Social Welfare Pol-
icy at the University of Michigan. Respondents were chosen randomly 
from a list of white and African American women who received cash 
assistance as single-parent cases in February 1997 in one urban county 
in Michigan. Respondents were interviewed fi ve times over a six-year 
period (Fall 1997, Fall 1998, Fall 1999, Fall 2001, Fall 2003). Response 
rates for the fi ve waves were high: 86, 92, 91, 91, and 93 percent, re-
spectively. There were 753 respondents in the fi rst wave. Because there 
is little evidence that attrition from the sample was nonrandom, sample 
weights are not used (see Cadena and Pape [2006] for an analysis). 
Information was gathered on factors known to affect welfare and 
food stamp usage, including employment, marriage and cohabitation, 
household size, race, and education. WES also gathered information 
on factors that are not usually available, including physical health and 
mental health status, experiences of domestic violence, child behavior, 
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and health problems. WES also contains monthly administrative data 
on food stamp and TANF participation provided by the Michigan Fam-
ily Independence Agency.4 
We combined survey and administrative data to create a panel data 
set with variables measured at the monthly level. We have measures of 
employment (self-reported) and TANF and food stamp receipt (admin-
istrative data) at this frequency. Most variables from the fi ve interviews 
were not measured on a monthly basis. We used retrospective relation-
ship questions asked at each wave to create a monthly marriage and 
cohabitation history for each woman.5 Most other questions refer to the 
respondent’s experiences during the interval between surveys. We apply 
the values of these variables backwards in time for all months between 
interviews. For example, suppose that in the wave 3 interview (1999) 
a woman reports having experienced severe domestic abuse since the 
last interview but that she did not report abuse at the wave 2 interview 
(1998). We code her as experiencing abuse in each month between the 
wave 2 and the wave 3 interview, but as not experiencing abuse in any 
month between waves 1 and 2. This methodology is imperfect and in-
troduces some measurement error.
TRENDS IN RECEIPT OF BENEFITS
Figure 5.1 shows monthly patterns of employment, cash welfare us-
age, and food stamp receipt. All respondents received TANF in Febru-
ary 1997, as benefi t receipt was the key study selection criterion. TANF 
receipt fell from February 1997 until early 2001, when it leveled off 
at about 20 percent and remained there until the study period ended. 
Almost all women received food stamps in February 1997. Receipt 
fell to about 45 percent by early 2000, stayed at this rate for about 18 
months, and then increased to about 50 percent in spring 2002, where 
it remained for the duration of the study. The monthly employment rate 
increased from about 40 percent in February 1997 to about 75 percent 
in mid-2000; it then fell during and after the 2001 recession; so that it 
was just under 70 percent at the fi nal WES survey (Fall 2003). 
As employment fell after 2000, food stamp participation increased 
but TANF participation did not. These simple trends suggest that, after 
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welfare reform, women were more likely to use food stamps than TANF 
in order to smooth temporary fl uctuations in earnings. We document 
this in Figure 5.2.
We select a sample of all spells of nonemployment preceded by 
a month in which the woman was working and received neither food 
stamps nor cash welfare. This sample includes women who have suc-
cessfully transitioned from welfare to work but who then experience at 
least one month of nonemployment. The Kaplan-Meier failure func-
tions in Figure 5.2 show the unconditional probability (i.e., not adjusted 
for covariates) that a woman will have returned to benefi t receipt after 
the number of months given on the x-axis. Women are more likely to re-
turn to food stamps than to cash assistance when work ends. After three 
months of nonemployment, 24 percent of women have returned to food 
stamps (Figure 5.2, Panel A) compared to 15 percent who have returned 
to cash welfare (Figure 5.2, Panel B). By nine months of nonemploy-
ment, the return rates are 42 and 23 percent, respectively. 
Figure 5.1  Employment, Cash Welfare Usage, and Food Stamp Receipt, 












1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Received cash welfare Received food stamps Employed
NOTE: Employment line ends January 2004.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Women’s Employment Study. The data in-
clude all available observations.
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Figure 5.2  Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Returning to Food Stamps 
within an Unemployment Spell (%)
NOTE: The sample includes all spells of unemployment preceded by a month of em-
ployment with no food stamps or cash welfare.
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Spell duration (months)










1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29
Spell Duration - MonthsFraction returning to cash welfare 95% confidence interval
Panel A
Panel B
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MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES—DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Our multivariate analyses examine three different aspects of food 
stamp dynamics. The fi rst examines factors that are associated with a 
recipient’s exit from the food stamp spell that was in progress when the 
sample was drawn. At that time, the typical respondent had received 
welfare and food stamps for about 7.5 years since she reached age 18 
and was in the midst of a 33-month spell. We consider the initial spell 
(fi rst exit) to be completed when she does not receive food stamps for 
two consecutive months. We treat spells that are ongoing at the date 
of the fi nal interview or that are ongoing when respondents leave the 
sample because of attrition as right-censored. We classify the initial ex-
its into two types: 1) spells ending in a month in which the woman was 
employed and 2) spells ending in a month in which she was not em-
ployed. Because we do not know monthly earnings, we cannot directly 
measure whether a spell ended because a woman’s income exceeded 
program limits. We consider exits with work as proxies for exits due 
to higher income. Exits that occur without work are likely the result of 
sanctions, family status changes like marriage or a child’s becoming 
an adult, or situations in which eligible recipients fail to comply with 
program rules.
Because the WES sampling frame selected women receiving cash 
welfare benefi ts in February 1997 (spells-in-progress), it oversamples 
longtime recipients. Fortunately, our administrative data contain the 
date the current cash welfare spell began. We assume that the food 
stamp spell also began on this date. Thus, there is measurement error to 
the extent that the food stamp spell began at another time. For February 
1997 we assign to each respondent the duration of the spell-in-progress. 
Our analysis of returns to food stamps after an exit is not subject to the 
length-bias problem. 
Figure 5.3 displays the percentage of food stamp spells that end 
by a given month following the beginning of the spell. The darker line 
shows the percentage of spells that end when a woman exits from her 
food stamp spell in a month in which she is employed. The bottom line 
shows spells that end without employment. For example, 24 months af-
ter the spell began, 32 percent of women had left the rolls in a month in 
which they were employed, and 13 percent had left in a month in which 
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they were without work. The remaining 55 percent of spells were still 
in progress.6 
The second analysis includes respondents who made a fi rst exit af-
ter April 1997 (the third month of the panel) and analyzes factors as-
sociated with their fi rst return to food stamp receipt. Each respondent 
contributes only one spell to each of the fi rst two samples. Figure 5.4 
displays this probability of returning. For example, at 24 months after 
their fi rst exit from food stamps, 61 percent of women had returned to 
the caseload. The third analysis focuses on returns to food stamps after 
spells of nonemployment. This dependent variable was shown in Figure 
5.2, Panel A.
Thus, food stamp participation is particularly dynamic. Most re-
spondents exit the program at least once during the study period, and 
most women who exit their initial spell return. 











6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78 84 90 96
Spell length (months)
Fraction exiting food stamps, employed Fraction exiting food stamps, not employed
NOTE: 95% confi dence intervals shown as dashed lines.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from Women’s Employment Study.
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REGRESSION MODELS
We estimate regression models that address several questions about 
food stamp dynamics. First, which characteristics are associated with a 
higher probability of leaving the food stamp spell that was in progress 
when the WES study began (fi rst exit)? Do these covariates have dif-
ferent associations for work-based versus nonwork exits? Then, which 
characteristics are associated with a higher probability of returning to 
food stamps after exiting from the caseload (fi rst return)? Finally, which 
characteristics are associated with reentry to food stamps conditional on 
experiencing a transition from work to nonemployment? 
We estimate the semiparametric proportional hazards model out-
lined in Cox (1972).7 The parameter of interest is the hazard rate λ(t)—
the probability that a spell ends in month t given that it has lasted until 
t. Cox’s model consists of two parts: 1) a baseline hazard that depends 
only on t (λ0[t]) and 2) a portion that depends on covariates. This speci-
fi cation does not require parametric assumptions about the baseline 
Figure 5.4  Kaplan-Meier Estimates for Ever Returning to Food Stamps 
After Initial Exit (%)
NOTE: 95% confi dence intervals shown as dashed lines.











1 6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 78
Spell duration (months)
Fraction returning to food stamps after initial exit
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hazard; the time pattern can take any form as long as it is common 
across spells. We model the portion that depends on covariates using an 
exponential functional form. The complete hazard rate, conditional on 
covariates x and coeffi cients β, is therefore
             .
 To estimate β, we assume that different covariate values lead to 
equal proportional changes in the likelihood that a spell ends in any 
month, regardless of the baseline probability. Our approach provides 
estimates that are robust to any form of time dependence in the baseline 
hazard. However, this approach does not allow us to test the nature of 
time dependence in the data. 
As a robustness check, we include dummy variables for calendar 
years to control for unobserved differences in policies and state en-
forcement efforts over the study period. We report hazard ratios (ex-
ponentiated coeffi cients) and delta method–based standard errors. The 
coeffi cients can be interpreted as the proportional effect of a one-unit 
increase in the covariate on the probability of the spell ending in a given 
month. A hazard ratio equal to one means that women have an equal 
probability of exit for all values of the covariate. Ratios greater than one 
imply that an increase in the covariate increases the hazard rate; ratios 
less than one imply the opposite.
REGRESSION RESULTS
We fi rst analyze exits from the initial food stamp spell, treating exits 
accompanied by employment and exits without employment as indepen-
dent competing risks. The baseline hazard and the effect of each covari-
ate can vary by type of exit. The hazard function we estimate is thus
      ,
with 0 representing employment-based exits and 1 representing non-
employment-based exits. This specifi cation is equivalent to estimating 
separate models for each exit type (treating observations that end with 
λ β λ β λ β( | , ) ( ) exp( ' ) ( ) exp( ' )t x t x t x= +0 0 1 1
λ β λ β( | , ) ( ) exp( ' )t x t x= 0
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the other exit type as censored). By estimating a model that allows for 
both types of exits simultaneously, we can test whether the covariates 
have the same proportional effect for both exit types.8
Table 5.1 defi nes the variables we use and presents their means and 
standard deviations, the number of observations, and the frequency with 
which the observations are measured. For example, age, education, and 
race are measured at the fi rst wave in Fall 1997. On the other hand, as 
mentioned above, we have monthly information on employment and 
receipt of TANF and food stamps. The typical respondent was about 
30 years old in 1997. About one-third of respondents had completed 
some education beyond high school, 37 percent had graduated from 
high school or completed a GED, and 31 percent had not fi nished high 
school. Over the course of the study period, a typical respondent worked 
for 67 percent of the months, received food stamps for 62 percent of the 
months, and received TANF for 40 percent of the months. 
At a typical wave, many respondents reported physical and mental 
health problems; one advantage of WES over other welfare-reform data 
sets is the extent of this information. About one quarter of respondents 
reported physical limitations that placed them in the bottom quartile of 
functioning for their age and reported their overall health as fair or poor. 
About one-third met the diagnostic screening criteria for one of several 
psychiatric disorders measured in the WES instrument. Six percent had 
serious substance abuse problems, and 13 percent had experienced se-
vere domestic abuse in the 12 months before the survey. These personal 
attributes, as documented elsewhere (Seefeldt and Orzol 2005; Turner, 
Danziger, and Seefeldt 2006), are associated with reduced work and 
increased TANF receipt among WES respondents.
Table 5.2 presents the results for the exit from the food stamp spell 
that was in progress in February 1997. In each of the three specifi ca-
tions, the fi rst column reports hazard ratios for employment-based exits 
and the second column gives hazard ratios for exits without work; the 
fi nal column (denoted as “Diff”) reports whether the proportional effect 
of the covariate on the hazard rate is signifi cantly different for the two 
exit types. The fi rst specifi cation includes only characteristics of wom-
en and their households that are fi xed at their 1997 values. Women with 
at least a high school degree are more likely to leave food stamps with 
a job in any given month than those who have not fi nished high school 
(the omitted category). There are no signifi cant effects of education on 
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the likelihood of exiting without work. With or without work, African 
Americans are less likely than whites to exit from food stamps. 
The coeffi cients on the fi xed attributes are attenuated in size and fall 
in signifi cance when we include the rich set of time-varying variables 
in the second specifi cation. This suggests that race and education are 
correlated with some of the variables included in the expanded model. 
Women living with a partner are more likely to exit with or without 
work than women not living with a partner: married women are 1.86 
times as likely to exit with work—and cohabiting women 1.27 times as 
likely—as women who do not live with partners. A husband’s fi nancial 
resources are more likely to raise a woman’s family income above the 
food stamp eligibility cutoff. Those who cohabit with an employed part-
ner may have less fi nancial need and hence be less likely to go through 
the recertifi cation process. 
For a given level of income, women with larger families are eligible 
for larger food stamp benefi ts, making them less likely to lose their 
eligibility when working. The analysis supports this hypothesis: each 
additional person in the household reduces the likelihood of exit with 
work by about 12 percent. 
Women with signifi cant problems with their physical or mental 
health or personal lives are less likely to fi nd and keep a job and hence 
less likely to exit food stamps with work. The evidence supports this 
hypothesis. For example, a woman with health problems is about 33 
percent less likely to exit with work, a woman with a mental health 
problem about 30 percent less likely, and one with a child with learning, 
mental health, or health problems about 36 percent less likely. Some 
women whose children have persistent problems may have been ex-
empted from the TANF work requirement (Seefeldt and Orzol 2005). 
Some critics of welfare reform expected that some recipients with 
many personal problems would fall through all the safety nets once 
reform was implemented (Edelman 1997). The fact that there is no sig-
nifi cant relationship between personal problems and food stamp exits 
without work (hazard ratios near one in the second column of the sec-
ond specifi cation) suggests that the most disadvantaged are no more 
likely than others to exit food stamps without work. On the other hand, 
other work with the WES (Turner, Danziger, and Seefeldt 2006) has 
shown that a small but growing proportion of women lose jobs and do 
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Table 5.1  Variable Descriptions and Descriptive Statistics—Women’s Employment Survey
Variable label Variable defi nition Mean Std. Dev. N Frequency
Age in 1997 Respondent’s age in years, measured at the time of fi rst 
interview
29.75 7.40 753 Fixed
Age squared/100 Age in 1997 squared, divided by 100 9.40 4.82 753 Fixed
High school diploma or GED 1 if respondent has exactly a high school degree or 
equivalent; 0 otherwise
0.37 0.48 753 Fixed
More than high school 1 if respondent has more education than a high school 
degree; 0 otherwise
0.32 0.47 753 Fixed
Race dummy: 1 if African American 1 if African-American; 0 otherwise 0.56 0.50 753 Fixed
Worked during this month 1 if respondent reports working at least one hour this 
month; 0 otherwise
0.67 0.47 49,428 Month
Received food stamps during this 
month
1 if administrative data show food stamp receipt for this 
month; 0 otherwise
0.62 0.49 49,428 Month
Received TANF during this month 1 if administrative data show TANF receipt for this month; 
0 otherwise
0.40 0.49 49,428 Month
Married 1 if married; 0 otherwise 0.17 0.38 49,381 Montha
Cohabiting, not married 1 if living with a male partner, but not married; 0 otherwise 0.28 0.45 49,417 Montha
Lagged unemployment rate in 
survey county
Monthly unemployment rate for the survey county, lagged 
one month
6.68 1.97 49,428 Month
Age-specifi c physical limitation & 
fair/poor health
1 if respondent has an age-specifi c physical limitation & 
reports fair or poor health; 0 otherwise
0.23 0.42 49,169 Wave
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Any mental health barrier 1 if respondent has any mental health problem (PTSD, 
general anxiety disorder, social phobia, depression); 
0 otherwise
0.34 0.47 49,428 Wave
Caregiven child has learning/ 
mental/physical health problem
1 if respondent is responsible for a child with special 
needs (learning disability, mental health or physical health 
problems); 0 otherwise
0.17 0.37 49,301 Wave
Any substance dependence or hard 
drug use
1 if respondent meets DSM-IV criteria for alcohol or drug 
dependence or uses “hard” drugs; 0 otherwise
0.06 0.23 49,305 Wave
Severe domestic abuse in past year 1 if respondent reports severe physical violence from an 
intimate partner; 0 otherwise
0.13 0.34 49,255 Wave
Owns a vehicle 1 if owns or has reliable access to a vehicle; 0 otherwise 0.79 0.41 49,418 Wave
Assets used to determine eligibility 1 if calendar date between 10/1999 and 9/2000; 0 otherwise 0.12 0.35 49,428 Month
Assets used × owns a car Interaction between “Owns a car” and “Assets used to 
determine eligibility”
0.35 0.32 49,418 Month
After EBT rollout 1 if after March 2001; 0 otherwise 0.14 0.48 49,428 Month
Knows still eligible for food stamps 
if working
1 if respondent answers “no” to the question “Once anyone 
receiving cash assistance gets a job, do the rules say they 
will stop receiving food stamps?”; 0 otherwise
0.67 0.47 630 Wave 3 
(Once)
NOTE: The number of observations for variables measured at the month or wave level is the number of valid person-months. Variables 
measured only at the wave level are assigned to individual months using the procedure described in the text.
aAlthough the marriage and cohabitation questions are only asked at each wave, they contain suffi cient detail to create an accurate monthly 
history.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Women’s Employment Survey.
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Age in 1997 0.947 1.088 0.994 1.068 1.000 1.110
(0.049) (0.096) (0.053) (0.096) (0.056) (0.107)
Age squared /100 1.073 0.884 1.016 0.909 1.002 0.863
(0.085) (0.119) (0.081) (0.125) (0.085) (0.125)
High school diploma or GED 1.548*** 0.845 ** 1.367** 0.906 1.465*** 0.948 *
(0.210) (0.174) (0.190) (0.194) (0.213) (0.209)
More than high school 1.723*** 0.798 *** 1.488*** 0.870 ** 1.566*** 0.807 **
(0.237) (0.175) (0.213) (0.200) (0.234) (0.194)
Race dummy: 1 if 
African American 
0.756*** 0.627*** 0.832 0.671** 0.807* 0.657**
(0.082) (0.110) (0.095) (0.125) (0.096) (0.129)
Married 1.859*** 2.078*** 1.883*** 1.943**
(0.310) (0.528) (0.324) (0.516)
Cohabiting, not married 1.273** 1.150 1.274* 1.123
(0.156) (0.240) (0.162) (0.245)
Number of people in household 0.876*** 1.000 * 0.876*** 1.014 **
(0.034) (0.056) (0.035) (0.058)
Age-specifi c physical limitation 
& fair/poor health
0.673*** 1.137 ** 0.680** 1.149 **
(0.102) (0.241) (0.106) (0.251)
Any mental health barrier 0.714*** 1.199 ** 0.711** 1.287 **
(0.093) (0.235) (0.096) (0.261)
Caregiven child has learning/mental/ 
physical health problem
0.634*** 0.845 0.584*** 0.818
(0.107) (0.195) (0.104) (0.194)
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Any substance dependence or hard 
drug use
0.790 1.001 0.808 1.102
(0.217) (0.356) (0.230) (0.395)
Severe abuse in past year 0.837 0.940 0.912 0.869
(0.148) (0.237) (0.167) (0.235)
Owns a vehicle 1.264 0.788 * 1.367* 0.745 *
(0.190) (0.171) (0.222) (0.167)
Lagged unemployment rate 
in survey county
0.949 1.015 0.956 1.011
(0.042) (0.061) (0.043) (0.065)
After EBT rollout 1.271 1.532 1.255 1.501
(0.713) (1.676) (0.705) (1.643)
Assets used to determine eligibility 0.762 1.172 0.831 1.117
(0.379) (0.663) (0.417) (0.634)
Assets used × Owns a car 1.356 0.483 1.234 0.519
(0.682) (0.297) (0.627) (0.320)




N spells 679 679 679 679 570 570
N exits 369 135  369 135  342 125
NOTE: The models also include dummy variables for each calendar year. The fi rst column in each specifi cation gives the hazard ratio for 
exit from food stamps accompanied by employment. The second column gives the hazard ratio for exit from food stamps without em-
ployment. The third column reports the signifi cance level on a test of equal proportionate effects on both types of exit. Exact partial likeli-
hood method used for ties. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. “Diff.” stands for “difference.”
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Women’s Employment Survey. 
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not return to welfare; however, many of them continue to receive food 
stamps.
We also evaluate two policy changes implemented by Michigan. As 
noted, in 2001, the state adopted an Electronic Benefi t Transfer system 
designed both to reduce fraud and to reduce the stigma of purchasing 
food by eliminating government coupons. Our analysis does not reveal 
any signifi cant change in the probability of food stamp exit following 
EBT implementation, perhaps because these two effects tend to offset 
each other. Because we have only time series variation in the EBT vari-
able, concurrent changes such as the rising unemployment rate might 
reduce our ability to identify an EBT effect.
We also examine how changes in the state’s treatment of assets af-
fected exit from the initial spell. For about one year in the middle of 
the study period, the state could not exclude the value of a car from the 
food stamp asset test. We include a dummy variable for the months in 
which an asset test was in place and an interaction with this variable 
and the vehicle ownership variable.9 We fi nd no evidence that asset test-
ing affected the probability of exit, whether or not a woman owned a 
vehicle.
The third specifi cation includes an indicator for knowledge about 
program rules. In Fall 1999, respondents were asked, “Once anyone re-
ceiving cash assistance gets a job, do the rules say they will stop receiv-
ing food stamps?” About a third did not know that “no” is the correct 
answer. Those answering correctly are about one quarter less likely to 
leave food stamps than women who answered incorrectly or were un-
sure. This suggests that some women who exited from TANF may have 
left food stamps by mistake, thinking that they were no longer eligible. 
Table 5.3 presents our analysis of the probability of reentering the 
food stamp rolls following an exit of at least two months. Many of the 
same attributes associated with a lower exit probability in Table 5.2 are 
associated with a higher return probability here. For example, African 
Americans are more likely to return than whites, and those with more 
education than a high school degree are less likely to return (all col-
umns, Table 5.3). Similarly, women who are married or cohabiting are 
much less likely to return to food stamps than women who do not live 
with partners (columns 2 and 3). Women who are not working are about 
1.7 times as likely as working women to return to food stamps; this is 
not surprising since nonworkers will have lower monthly incomes than 
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workers. Additionally, when the county unemployment rate increases 
by one percentage point, women are 1.13 times as likely to return to 
food stamps. High unemployment rates likely translate into less job se-
curity and worse employment prospects for those looking for work and 
hence encourage women to return to food stamp receipt. 
Women who own cars are about 30 percent less likely to return to 
food stamps than those who do not. Car ownership may be a proxy for 
greater economic stability, indicating that the woman has and expects to 
continue to have stable employment. Alternatively, women may be mis-
informed about the treatment of assets and, thinking that the car makes 
them ineligible, may not reapply. Any of these mechanisms could ex-
plain why car owners are less likely to return. 
Women who experienced severe domestic violence in the year be-
fore the survey are about 50 percent more likely than others to return to 
food stamps. Some women may leave a violent relationship suddenly 
and unexpectedly and then seek public assistance. It represents a policy 
success when battered women return to food stamps as part of their 
coping strategy.
Knowledge of the food stamp eligibility rule concerning combin-
ing work and benefi ts does not predict with any statistical signifi cance 
who returns to the rolls (Table 5.3, column 3). This confl icts with the 
data in Table 5.2 showing that program knowledge reduced the prob-
ability of an exit. The lack of relationship between knowledge and food 
stamp returns could be due to heterogeneity in the types of women who 
exited and are thus eligible to return. Some women may exit when they 
earn enough to make them ineligible for benefi ts. Their correct knowl-
edge of the ability to combine work and food stamps cannot affect their 
likelihood of return since they are ineligible. Other women are eligible 
to combine employment and food stamp benefi ts but may be dispro-
portionately likely to believe incorrectly that they are ineligible. The 
women who knew they were eligible may have never left the caseload. 
This differential selection can explain the insignifi cant results for the 
knowledge indicator in the return specifi cation. 
Women were much less likely to return to food stamps after cou-
pons were replaced by the Bridge Card in 2001. This result does not 
support the hypothesis that EBT removed a stigma that was keeping 
women from participating. We do not consider this a defi nitive test of 
the effect of EBT on participation because the policy changes only once 
up08djivafch5.indd   125 10/8/2008   10:30:33 AM
126   Cadena, Danziger, and Seefeldt
Table 5.3  Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models for 
First Return to Food Stamps
(1) (2) (3)
Age in 1997 0.937 0.921 0.914
(0.057) (0.060) (0.061)
Age squared /100 1.079 1.102 1.109
(0.104) (0.113) (0.117)
High school diploma or GED 0.798 0.901 0.920
(0.110) (0.129) (0.135)
More than high school 0.567*** 0.704** 0.722**
(0.084) (0.110) (0.116)






Cohabiting, not married 0.666*** 0.696**
(0.094) (0.100)
Owns a vehicle 0.700** 0.711**
(0.117) (0.123)
Number of people in household 0.974 0.976
(0.038) (0.039)




Any mental health barrier 1.053 1.039
(0.148) (0.149)








Severe abuse in past year 1.520** 1.521**
(0.260) (0.266)




After EBT rollout 0.313*** 0.353**
(0.132) (0.153)
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over the sample period and could easily be confounded with other fac-
tors changing at a similar time.
The specifi cation in Table 5.4 is similar to that in Table 5.3, except 
the sample is restricted only to those who have exited a food stamp 
spell and who have experienced a transition from work to nonwork. The 
results are quite similar to those in Table 5.3, with the exception that 
women who have mental health problems are about 50 percent more 
likely to return to food stamps during a spell of unemployment than 
those who do not have mental health problems.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our empirical results provide some good news from a policy perspec-
tive. First, food stamp participation among WES respondents was more 
sensitive to employment variability than was TANF receipt. Second, 
those with health and mental problems are less likely to exit food stamps 
with work, but they are not more likely to exit without work. Women in 
larger households are less likely than similar women in smaller house-
holds to exit, probably because their earnings are farther below the food 
stamp eligibility cutoff, which increases with household size. Similarly, 
(1) (2) (3)
Assets used to determine eligibility 1.172 1.179
(0.386) (0.390)
Assets used × owns a car 1.268 1.252
(0.424) (0.422)




N spells 527 527 490
N returns 341 341 324
NOTE: The models also include dummy variables for each calendar year. Exact partial 
likelihood method used for ties. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. Standard 
errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Women’s Employment Survey. 
Table 5.3  (continued)
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Table 5.4  Hazard Ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard Models for 
Return to Food Stamps during an Unemployment Spell
(1) (2) (3)
Age in 1997 0.700*** 0.649*** 0.658***
(0.068) (0.071) (0.075)
Age squared /100 1.727*** 1.934*** 1.904***
(0.262) (0.341) (0.347)
High school diploma or GED 0.559** 0.623* 0.583**
(0.128) (0.154) (0.150)
More than high school 0.437*** 0.463** 0.427***
(0.122) (0.141) (0.134)




Cohabiting, not married 0.666 0.669
(0.177) (0.185)
Owns a vehicle 1.492 1.692
(0.486) (0.576)
Number of people in household 0.951 0.960
(0.072) (0.073)




Any mental health barrier 1.506* 1.517*
(0.348) (0.363)








Severe abuse in past year 1.414 1.533
(0.405) (0.449)




After EBT rollout 0.464 0.459
(0.287) (0.284)
Assets used to determine eligibility 2.563 2.721
(1.633) (1.748)
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when the county unemployment rate is higher and when women experi-
ence job loss, they are more likely to return to the Food Stamp Program. 
We also fi nd that women with recent experiences with severe abuse are 
more likely than others to return to the food stamp rolls.
These fi ndings tell us about the relative likelihood of staying on 
or returning to food stamps, not about the participation rate of eligible 
families. Increased outreach efforts might be warranted, given the con-
fusion respondents express about food stamp rules and given their em-
ployment instability. Women who understand that they are allowed to 
combine food stamp receipt with low-wage work are signifi cantly more 
likely to continue to receive food stamps. On the other hand, women 
who own vehicles are less likely to return to food stamps, perhaps in-
dicating misunderstanding about car ownership rules. An outreach pro-
gram that provided information about eligibility might increase partici-
pation rates. 
Although the typical respondent in our Michigan sample worked 
in almost 70 percent of the months over the six-and-one-half-year pan-
el, more than half experienced at least one spell of “unstable employ-
ment,” defi ned as having been fi red, laid off, or otherwise not having 
worked for more than four weeks (Johnson 2006). Food stamp receipt 
helps cushion earnings losses, but many who lost jobs did not return 
to the program. While some women fi nd new jobs relatively quickly, 
many experience long spells of nonemployment without receiving food 
assistance.10 
(1) (2) (3)
Assets used × owns a car 0.419 0.387
(0.271) (0.253)




N spells 344 336 330
N returns 112 109 106
NOTE: The models also include dummy variables for each calendar year. Exact partial 
likelihood method used for ties. * = p < 0.10; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. Standard 
errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ Calculations from the Women’s Employment Survey. 
Table 5.4  (continued)
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A study of local agency practices indicates that it may not be the 
particular type of outreach activity that matters but the number of activ-
ities in which an offi ce engages (Bartlett, Burstein, and Hamilton 2004). 
Outreach is usually low-cost and includes activities such as preparing 
informational pamphlets and posters for distribution in community cen-
ters and other public places, operating a toll-free information hotline, 
and coordinating outreach activities with the local Medicaid and State 
Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) offi ces. Such activities better 
provide information about eligibility to eligible nonparticipants.
Although economic conditions in the nation have improved since 
the 2001 recession, many low-income families have not yet benefi ted 
from the recovery: poverty rates remain above 2000 levels, and the 
number of individuals who are food-insecure increased by six million 
between 1999 and 2004 (Rosenbaum 2006). The Food Stamp Program 
provides economic support for millions of working poor families, and 
our results suggest that more should be done to encourage eligible non-
participants to apply for the benefi ts to which they are entitled.
Notes
This chapter comes from a paper presented at the conference “Income Volatility and Im-
plications for Food Assistance Programs II,” sponsored by the National Poverty Center, 
Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, and by the Economic 
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, in November 2006. Pamela Loprest, 
Dean Jolliffe, Jeffrey Smith, and James Ziliak provided helpful comments on a previous 
draft. Any opinions expressed are solely those of the authors.
 1. In the WES data, described below, a woman receiving TANF in April 1997 had 
received aid for at least 60 days since the sample was drawn from the February 
1997 caseload. 
 2. Amounts were computed using the “marriage calculator” available from the Ad-
ministration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. We assume that the woman has no assets, no vehicle, receives no child 
support, and has been on TANF for at least six months. The calculator is available 
at http://marriagecalculator.acf.hhs.gov/marriage/calculator.php (accessed April 
28, 2008).
 3. Michigan has since adopted a 48-month time limit that went into effect in late 
2007.
 4. The agency’s name has since been changed to the Michigan Department of Human 
Services.
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 5. Respondents were asked if they were married or cohabiting and, if so, for how 
many months. Single women were asked to specify the month in which a previous 
marriage or cohabiting relationship ended.
 6. These estimates use the cumulative incidence approach, so the probabilities add to 
one. 
 7. We use the exact partial likelihood method to handle ties (exits occurring in the 
same month) because our exits are measured in discrete time intervals. 
 8. To estimate these models, we augment our data using the methodology outlined in 
Lunn and McNeil (1995). 
 9. The WES survey asks a respondent if she owns a vehicle or has consistent, reliable 
access to one. We label all positive responses as vehicle ownership, even though 
some women do not own a vehicle. There is measurement error for these women, 
since their use of someone else’s car would not affect their food stamp eligibility.
 10. A limitation of our study is that our sample is drawn from a particular county in 
a single state. Both TANF and food stamp policies vary by state, and our fi nd-
ings may not be generalizable to states with different policy regimes. However, it 
seems reasonable to assume that lack of knowledge of program rules is a common 
problem that might be addressed by outreach efforts.
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